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ABSTRACT
Objectives: An increased understanding of the reasons for
noncompliance and lack of persistence with prescribed medi-
cation is an important step to improve treatment effective-
ness, and thus patient health. Explanations have been
attempted from epidemiological, sociological, and psycho-
logical perspectives. Economic models (utility maximization,
time preferences, health capital, bilateral bargaining, stated
preference, and prospect theory) may contribute to the under-
standing of medication-taking behavior.
Methods: Economic models are applied to medication non-
compliance. Traditional consumer choice models under a
budget constraint do apply to medication-taking behavior in
that increased prices cause decreased utilization. Neverthe-
less, empiric evidence suggests that budget constraints are not
the only factor affecting consumer choice around medicines.
Examination of time preference models suggests that the
intuitive association between time preference and medication
compliance has not been investigated extensively, and has not
been proven empirically. The health capital model has theo-
retical relevance, but has not been applied to compliance.
Bilateral bargaining may present an alternative model to
concordance of the patient–prescriber relationship, taking
account of game-playing by either party. Nevertheless, there
is limited empiric evidence to test its usefulness. Stated pref-
erence methods have been applied most extensively to medi-
cines use.
Results: Evidence suggests that patients’ preferences are con-
sistently affected by side effects, and that preferences change
over time, with age and experience. Prospect theory attempts
to explain how new information changes risk perceptions
and associated behavior but has not been applied empirically
to medication use.
Conclusions: Economic models of behavior may contribute
to the understanding of medication use, but more empiric
work is needed to assess their applicability.
Keywords: compliance, economic theory, medication use,
patient behavior.
Introduction
Around a quarter of patients do not take theirmedicines
as prescribed [1,2]. If a medicine has been pre-
scribed appropriately, this represents a lost opportunity
to improve or maintain a patient’s health status. The
potential consequences of noncompliance with an
appropriatemedicine can be divided into health beneﬁts
forgone (human cost and opportunities lost) and pro-
ductivity costs (personal and social economic burden).
Interventions to improve compliance and persistence do
not seem to have been very effective in reducing the
public health burden of chronic disease [3,4]. Reviews
suggest that interventions have largely concentrated on
educating patients, with many being multifaceted, but
without evidence for inclusion of each component.
They are generally not based on actual reasons for
noncompliance [3,5,6]. The most effective interven-
tions are those that promote sustained behavior change
[7–9]. Furthermore, linking improved compliance to
improved outcomes has proved problematic [3,10]. A
recent study by Lee et al. demonstrates that a compre-
hensive pharmacy care program on medication com-
pliance is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in
compliance and persistence [11]. This study also found
a signiﬁcant decrease in systolic blood pressure among
patients treated for hypertension and a signiﬁcant low-
ering of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C)
among patients treated for hyperlipidemia [11].
Increased understanding of the reasons for noncom-
pliance and lack of persistence is required before inter-
ventions can be expected to improve compliance,
and thus patient health.
Researchers and practitioners are becoming increas-
ingly aware that compliance with medicines is a
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complex area of human behavior, reﬂected by the
World Health Organization deﬁnition of noncompli-
ance as, “a multidimensional phenomenon determined
by the interplay of ﬁve sets of factors: patient-related,
condition-related, therapy-related, health system
factors and social/factors” [2].
Explanations of patients’ noncompliance with
prescribed treatments have been attempted from
epidemiological, sociological, and psychological per-
spectives. More recently, economists have begun to
work with psychologists to examine people’s choice
behavior in health-related decision-making more
closely [12]. These economic explanatory models may
contribute to the understanding of medication-taking
behavior. In this article, we summarize existing knowl-
edge around reasons for noncompliance. We then
describe relevant economic models and present an
argument for their use to further explain medication
noncompliance. First, we examine the more traditional
economic theories: utility maximization (supply and
demand), time preferences, and health capital. Next,
we explore extensions to these models including bilat-
eral bargaining, stated preference, and prospect theory.
In each section we provide a brief explanation of each
model, relate the model to patient medication-taking
behavior, and present an example.
Existing Knowledge Around Reasons for
Medication Noncompliance
It is important, when referring to noncompliance, to
deﬁne the various aspects of noncompliance. “Concor-
dance” refers to a patient-centered process where
health-care professionals make a therapeutic alliance
with a patient, one result of which may be increased
compliance or persistence [13]. Concordance is used in
this article as a phrase to capture the “agreement” that
needs to take place in the initial doctor–patient con-
sultation. If patients do not agree at this stage, then it
stands to reason that they will not ﬁll their initial
prescription. Failure to ﬁll the initial prescription is
sometimes referred to as “primary noncompliance.”
We use “compliance” to refer to the day-to-day
medication-taking and as a measure of missed doses,
and inaccuracies in timing of doses. “Persistence”
describes the duration of continuation with therapy,
and is of particular importance in chronic disease
management. These concepts are in congruence with
ISPOR deﬁnitions [14]. Evidence suggests that remem-
bering is a key element in achieving successful compli-
ance to medication [15,16]. One study suggests that
50% of noncompliance may be due to forgetting to
take the medicine [17]. This is often referred to as
“unintentional noncompliance,” rather than “inten-
tional” noncompliance where people choose not to
take a medicine. Poor motivation to take a medicine is
thought to increase the likelihood of forgetting, so the
distinction between the two behaviors is not as clear-
cut as it might appear [18,19].
Most commonly, an epidemiological approach has
looked at identifying “at-risk” groups for (intentional)
noncompliance. These studies suggest that compliance
with medicines appears to increase with higher income
and reduced medication costs, is related to education
and social support, and may be affected variably by
age, sex, cognitive function, general socioeconomic
status, impact of a speciﬁc disease, presence of depres-
sion, and regimen complexity [1,20–22]. A large body
of research examines the effect of information and
knowledge on compliance. Nevertheless, these studies
do not provide proof of causality because it is not clear
how these factors contribute to noncompliance and
a consistent link between knowledge and compli-
ance has not yet been demonstrated [3]. Sociological
and psychological frameworks have afforded greater
understanding of noncompliance with medicines, by
suggesting that intentional noncompliance is not a
deviant behavior that stems from ignorance or particu-
lar “character traits” or sociodemographic chara-
cteristics. Compliance is better conceptualized as a
variable behavior, rather than a trait characteristic:
most people are noncompliant some of the time [23].
The failure of epidemiological models can be attrib-
uted to the lack of emphasis given to barriers to com-
pliance and a lack of attention to motivational factors.
This in turn can be attributed to the dominance of the
health professional’s perspective which assumes that
patients passively attempt to comply with providers’
advice and instructions. Psychosocial explanatory
frameworks suggest that people often need to under-
stand or evaluate their medicines before deciding
whether to take them and may make cost–beneﬁt or
risk–beneﬁt choices about treatment options within
their own belief and preference framework [23,24]. A
substantial amount of qualitative research targeting
patients’ perceptions of medicines exists. A meta-
synthesis of this body of work provides an explanatory
framework that incorporates patients’ perceptions
and preferences, and suggests an overall resistance to
taking medicines [25]. Quantitative research into
factors affecting compliance has been carried out using
psychological frameworks, such as social cognition
models (health belief model and the theory of planned
behavior). This work suggests that compliance can be
seen as a volitional act which is, to some extent, the
result of a rational decision by the patient [26]. Exam-
ining patient decision-making provides a more com-
prehensive framework for explaining noncompliance.
The necessity-concerns framework, in particular, iden-
tiﬁes the processes used by patients to balance con-
cerns about the medicine with perceived necessity [27].
Concerns about medicines can be generic, such as con-
cerns about “addiction,” use of “chemicals,” or very
speciﬁc, such as weight gain with steroid inhalers [28].
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Patients may be less likely to take medicines if per-
ceived necessity is outweighed by perceived concerns
[26]. It is not yet clear how these decisions change over
time.
In addition to the various frameworks surrounding
compliance issues, heterogeneity in diseases and treat-
ments add to the complexity. Some conditions present
substantial symptoms that may or may not impair
function while others are silent diseases without any
outward signs or symptoms. The medications used to
treat diseases also have variations which in turn affect
compliances such as dosing frequency, side effects,
effectiveness, and complications to medication-taking
(take while standing, no driving, etc.). When research-
ers examine the proposed models regarding compli-
ance, these factors will need to be incorporated as
appropriate to the disease and treatments studied.
Traditional Consumer Choice Theory
Economic theory, supported by empiric evidence, sug-
gests that for a normal good, increased price of a good
leads to reduced demand. Within the context of taking
medicines, the costs associated with medicines can be
complex. Depending on the health system and an indi-
vidual patient’s insurance coverage, a patient may have
access to free medicines, pay a fraction of full price
such as a copayment, or incur the total market price of
the medicine. Prices of medicines are also subject to
complex mechanisms, depending on the presence, or
not, of a generic preparation. Also, the same medicine
may have different prices depending on national,
regional, or local contracting or reimbursement
arrangements. The effect of “cost-sharing” by patients
is twofold: to produce revenue for the payer, and
to reduce inappropriate demand (“ex-poste moral
hazard”). The full transaction price of medication may
also include the cost of the time to purchase and use
the health services that has been shown to be signiﬁ-
cant in some medical services [29].
Cost-sharing mechanisms vary between and within
countries. A large body of research in the United States
and Canada links patient cost-sharing, such as pre-
scription copayments, to reduced drug use, increased
morbidity such as hospitalization, and increased costs.
A recent review summarizes the “best” of studies on
the effects of cost-sharing mechanisms these [22] and
nearly all of the 24 studies show that increases in
out-of-pocket payments decreases drug use and affects
health outcomes in the chronically ill. Policies that
decrease established drug beneﬁt coverage or increase
patient cost-sharing, consistently reduce the use of
appropriate and essential medicines such as thiazide
diuretics and psychotropic agents (e.g., antidepres-
sants), in addition to reducing inappropriate use and
drug costs. Patients, forced to reduce medication use
because of cost, may choose nonessential medications
with symptomatic beneﬁts (e.g., nonsteroidal anti-
inﬂammatory drugs) while forgoing essential medica-
tions that prolong life and prevent morbidity (e.g.,
antihypertensive agents).
For example, studies found up to 46% reductions in
use for both ineffective and effective medicines if drug
copayments are introduced [30,31]. Other conse-
quences of price increases are that people who have
lower income wait until their condition is more serious
before consulting a doctor [32] and they reduce costs
by not ﬁlling prescriptions, reducing intake, and hag-
gling about price [33]. In Canada, increased cost-
sharing by patients led to 15% to 22% reductions in
essential drug use among the poor and elderly [31].
There was an increase of 88% to 117% in serious
adverse events and 43% to 78% in emergency depart-
ment visits, associated with decreases in use of essen-
tial medicines.
A small amount of equivalent research exists in
Europe [34,35]. In Sweden, Lundberg et al. reported
that the young, those with poor health status, low
educational level, and low income were most likely to
decrease use of prescription drugs when user charges
were increased [34]. In Germany, poorer insurance
coverage has been shown to reduce use of migraine
medicines [35].
The copayment on prescriptions in England is cur-
rently £6.85, which is almost 30 times higher than the
50 cents reported to reduce compliance in a US study
[21]. This is also a higher “ﬁxed” copayment than
Austria or Germany [36]. Denmark, Finland, France,
Italy, and The Netherlands use graduated charges,
depending on pack size or drug cost. In April 2007,
prescription copayments were abolished in Wales—the
likely impact of this on patient compliance will be
signiﬁcant, particularly as there is some evidence to
suggest that medication cost is a barrier that affects
compliance in the United Kingdom [37–39]. Research
suggests that, in fact, as many as 750,000 people in
England and Wales may not be ﬁlling prescriptions
because of cost [40], and patients’ cost reduction strat-
egies are similar to those in the United States [41].
From this evidence, we see that traditional models
of consumer choice under a budget constraint do apply
to medication-taking behavior in that increased prices
cause decreased utilization. Nevertheless, these models
do not fully illustrate or explain medication-taking
behavior. For example, prescription medicines are free
to 85% of the UK population, and yet compliance and
persistence rates are no higher than in other countries.
This suggests that income budget constraints are not
the only factor affecting consumer choice, and thus
other aspects of economic models such as time con-
straints, time preference, and human capital should be
considered.
According to consumer choice theory, one would
also expect that ﬁnancial incentives might encourage
patients to comply. This is supported by evidence
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which suggests that compensating individuals for the
time, effort, and cost involved with taking medicines
is an effective measure to improve compliance [42].
Financial incentives in the form of cash, vouchers,
lottery tickets, or gifts are associated with improve-
ments in the percentage of patients complying. Ten out
of the 11 studies identiﬁed in the systematic review
showed that some form of ﬁnancial incentive pro-
moted compliance better than any alternative. A
reanalysis of their data, assuming a random effects
model, suggests that for those given a ﬁnancial incen-
tive, the pooled risk of being compliant is 1.32 (95%
conﬁdence interval 1.17–1.49) of the risk of being
compliant with no ﬁnancial incentive (c2 = 19.2,
df = 1, P < 0.0001).
More recent studies have supported these ﬁndings;
homeless adults with tuberculosis infection living in
San Francisco respond favorably to low-cost incentives
to improve compliance with preventive therapy [43]
among intravenous drug users; monetary incentives
are superior to outreach in achieving compliance to the
multidose hepatitis B vaccine series [44]; and the use
of personalized cues for remembering particular dose
times combined with cash reinforcement led to tran-
sient improvement in compliance with antiretroviral
therapy [45]. Incentives and competitions, however, do
not appear to enhance long-term smoking cessation
rates, with early success tending to dissipate when the
rewards are no longer offered [46].
Theoretical work by Giuffrida and Gravelle [47]
supports the use of ﬁnancial incentives to increase
compliance when treatment compliance has a beneﬁt
to society beyond the beneﬁt any individual gains.
They propose an application of welfare theory to the
use of ﬁnancial incentives for compliance. What their
theory ﬁnds is that if ﬁnancial incentives are used to
increase compliance (in the form of any type of valued
societal resource, money, or other resources), then the
optimal level of compliance in a society decreases in
direct proportion to the society resources expended on
rewarding individual compliance. The authors show
that in some, but not all cases, the use of ﬁnancial
incentives to increase compliance will increase social
welfare. This is true provided there are sufﬁcient posi-
tive beneﬁts from compliance to individuals other than
the noncompliance individual. Compliance must be
costless or very cheap to verify, and the number of
noncompliant members of society must be indepen-
dent of the ﬁnancial incentive itself. Besides basing
their model on social welfare theory, the Giuffrida and
Gravelle model assumes that compliance provides a
positive externality. This assumption could be argued
for vaccinations; it is more suspect in other diseases.
Time Preference and Medication Compliance
Time preference refers to the extent to which decision-
makers (such as patients) are ready to trade off
between short-term costs and/or gains with long-term
costs/gains that are associated with a particular course
of action [48,49]. Such decisions are a function of the
value placed on future outcomes relative to immediate
ones. The concept of time preference is a key factor to
understand complex health behavior [50]. Current
health behavior models often do not underscore the
importance of time in patients’ perception of treatment
costs, beneﬁts and harms, and their intention to follow
the prescribed regimen [51].
The current value of future utility can be com-
puted using the intertemporal discount rates [52].
For example, individuals with lower time preference
will have higher value for future utility, are more
forward-looking, and discount the future less than
those with less value on the future. Thus, for indi-
viduals who do not value the future at all, they will
totally discount future beneﬁts, indicating no future
utility value. Consequently, as time preference in-
creases, one can infer that the person values future
utility less now than he/she did earlier. Different
mathematical models of time preference exist, e.g.,
the discounted utility model of Samuelson [53], and
the hyperbolic discounting model of Angeletos [54].
Time preference models have been utilized in health-
care research to understand peoples’ health behavior
(e.g., smoking, exercise) in decision-making under
uncertainty over time [55].
The concept of time preference can be extended to
understand peoples’ medication compliance behavior.
One would expect an inverse relationship between
medication compliance and time preference. Consider
a hypothetical example of the use of time preference
models in understanding compliance with oral antidia-
betic medication for type 2 diabetes. The beneﬁts of
complying with the current prescribed regimen are not
immediate. Taking medications regularly costs today
in terms of person’s time (with the associated oppor-
tunity costs), efforts, risk of side effect, and maybe
monetary investment (costs of medication therapy,
traveling to the physicians’ ofﬁce and pharmacy), while
potential health beneﬁts such as reduced risk of
diabetes-related complications and associated comor-
bidities are largely in the future. An individual with a
lower rate of time preference will be expected to value
the future beneﬁts offered by taking medications regu-
larly as prescribed and will have higher medication-
related persistence/compliance. According to the time
preference model, a person who discounts future out-
comes steeply may be less compliant (or less likely to
be compliant) as compared to a person who values the
future outcomes more than the present outcomes.
Thus, a patient’s time preference, though associated
with factors such as age, sex, race, education, severity
of disease, associated comorbidities [56,57], would
affect both their compliance and persistence with their
medication.
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The intuitive association between time preference
and medication compliance, however, has not been
investigated extensively, and has not been proven
empirically [58]. In assessing the decisions of working
adults to accept or decline a free inﬂuenza vaccination
offered at their workplace, Chapman found very little
relationship between scenario measures of time prefer-
ences and the acceptance of vaccine [58]. They also
conducted a separate experiment in patients with
hypertension. Compliance with antihypertensive treat-
ments was measured, and correlated with time prefer-
ence. Although this provided more opportunities for
detecting a relationship between scenario measures
of time preference and preventive health behavior,
no signiﬁcant correlation was observed. In their
third experiment, Chapman assessed time preference
and compliance in patients being treated with a
cholesterol-lowering medication [58]. The hypothesis
that those who preferred the larger, delayed medica-
tion effect (demonstrating a high value for future out-
comes) would be more compliant, was unconﬁrmed.
No relationship between responses to a time prefer-
ence scenario and adherence to a cholesterol-lowering
medication regimen was observed.
Studies such as these, however, may be limited by
the choice of study design. Previous literature examin-
ing the association between medication compliance
and time preference used measures such as describing
hypothetical situations/real-world example to partici-
pants and gaining knowledge about their time prefer-
ence. Measures of compliance used in these studies
relied mainly on patient-reported compliance, pre-
scription reﬁll patterns, pill count, and measuring
clinical outcomes, e.g., blood pressure or LDL-C mea-
surement. In addition, it is important to take into
account an effect of confounders mentioned above.
Future studies might consider the use of more sophis-
ticated time preference scenarios that would provide
more precise measures of time preference as well as
more objective measures of compliance. The effects of
time preferences on persistence are not examined and
often omitted in research, yet could provide key infor-
mation regarding why certain individuals are prone to
persist with their treatment.
Health Capital Models
Although traditional consumer choice models and time
preference models may explain issues in medication-
taking behavior, they still lack many factors that
may explain noncompliance. Economists have exa-
mined how certain commodities have dual uses—
consumption as well as production. According to
Becker’s Human Capital Model [59], increases in a
person’s stock of knowledge or human capital raise
his/her productivity in the market to produce more
earnings as well as nonmarket or household commodi-
ties. The application of health to this model was devel-
oped by Grossman [60].
In Grossman’s health capital model, health is
demanded by consumers as 1) a consumption com-
modity as it directly enters the consumers’ preference
functions, and 2) an investment commodity as one’s
health determines the time available for both market
(such as labor or household production) and nonmar-
ket activities. The addition of health as an investment
commodity expands on traditional models of con-
sumer choice under budget constraints and time con-
straints. Thus, traditional price effects as well as time
preferences apply to this model. In the model, one is
born with a stock of health, which depreciates over
time. One can affect the depreciation rate through
investments in health such as complying or persisting
with medication regimens. The effect of this invest-
ment or a person’s production of health is reﬂective of
the person’s characteristics, which may lead to more
efﬁcient health production. For example, one may
invest in their education and knowledge through
higher education. This increase in knowledge could
increase the ability of a person to utilize health care
more efﬁciently by complying with medicines,
engaging their physician in dialogue regarding their
treatment, and recognizing potential side effects or
treatment failure.
An example of application of the health capital
model for compliance would be the effect of medica-
tion compliance on the depreciation rate of health over
time. One could imagine that for antidiabetic medica-
tion, for instance, treatment compliance would slow
the health stock depreciation rate and that noncom-
pliance (or nonpersistence) could cause triggers to
increase the depreciation rate. This would affect not
only a person’s health, but their labor force participa-
tion, as well as leisure time. A fully inclusive health
capital model would have to include time preference
and human capital aspects. This would allow the
empiric investigation of the impact of interventions
such as education and the unintended consequences of
factors such as drug price increases or service delivery
changes.
Bilateral Bargaining Models
Other economic models exist that extend beyond tra-
ditional models of utility maximization such as health
capital, game theory, and prospect theory. Bilateral
bargaining models may more appropriately describe
the interaction between patients and health-care pro-
viders. An important component of disease manage-
ment is effective communication between patient and
health-care provider [61,62]. This two-way social
interaction can affect patient compliance with therapy
positively, or adversely. Chronic disease management
requires some level of agreement between the patient
and his/her provider over the type and intensity of
604 Elliott et al.
treatment, leading to the development of shared
decision-making models that provide a framework
for understanding this complex interaction. A large
conceptual and empiric literature focused on the
components required for a “concordant” consul-
tation or shared decision-making exists, but there
is no consideration of “games-playing.” Bargaining
models may provide a more global framework for
research on factors that determine the success of such
consultations.
As an important part of the economic literature
since Nash ﬁrst introduced them in the early 1950s,
bargaining models apply to situations where two or
more individuals must agree unanimously on a single
outcome in order for either person to obtain that
outcome [63,64]. In a Nash bargaining model, if two
people cannot agree on the same outcome, then neither
of them gets that outcome. Hence, when bargainers
fail to agree, the only possible outcomes they can get
are those that they can get by themselves without the
cooperation of the other person.
Consider, for example, a doctor–patient consulta-
tion that leads to a prescription being issued. Individu-
als and their medical providers engage in bargaining
each time they agree to a treatment plan. Both parties
must agree on the “terms of use” (e.g., Is the diagnosis
correct? What are the potential risks and beneﬁts? Is
the dosing schedule convenient?), before acceptance of
the prescription can take place. Without real agree-
ment to these terms, the patient is not certain that the
prescriber understands and can respond to their needs,
and the prescriber cannot be certain that the patient
will ﬁll their prescription, let alone take any doses.
When two parties fail to agree, then neither gets the
outcome that was possible through agreement, but
they both can still have whatever other outcomes
are available to them outside of bargaining. A failed
bargaining agreement for the doctor means that the
intended therapeutic outcome is unlikely, but the
doctor may still issue the prescription (an outcome that
is available to the doctor outside of “bargaining” with
the patient). For the patients, whatever outcomes they
can obtain without bargaining are commonly known
as their “outside options.” These may include primary
noncompliance, or purchasing of alternative and pos-
sibly less efﬁcacious medicines, or not following the
treatment plan as prescribed. Also, the patient may
not intend to bargain at all, without the prescriber
knowing. A patient may go to their consultation as
part of their “sick role” to legitimize their illness but
with no intention of ﬁlling a prescription, such may
happen in a system where patients have free consulta-
tions but have to pay for medicines. Clearly, when
people are interested in engaging in bargaining with
each other, there is at least one bargaining outcome
that both of them prefer to any of their outside
options. If this were not true, then whoever strictly
preferred their outside option would simply take that
outcome instead of trying to bargain for an outcome
that is less valuable to them. Hence, when an outside
option is strictly preferred over anything that can be
obtained by bargaining, then no bargaining occurs.
This is an intuitively easy concept and a critical
element for applying bargaining models to treatment
compliance.
Tarrant provides a basic review of several game
theory models besides Nash’s prisoner dilemma
including the assurance game and centipede game [65].
He also discusses the potential of applying the models
to the medical encounter but does not explore their
uses empirically [65]. Studies have applied game
theory to decision-analytic models to the management
of diseases. Speciﬁcally, Sonnenberg has developed
decision-theoretic models applying the Nash model to
the management of reﬂux as well as to the decision for
endoscopy [66,67]. This provides a useful application
but does not test if this is the appropriate model. Other
researchers have used the game-theoretic model to
explore physician behavior, speciﬁcally to examine
supplier-induced demand [68]. These theoretical
models apply the Nash model to physician supply
models as another model to explain supplier-induced
demand but do not test the models. Researchers have
also used game theory to examine contraceptive choice
between different types of partners [69]. Applying both
the Nash and Stackelberg models, they found that the
best ﬁtting model depends on the population studied
[70]. This research reﬂects that the decision-making
dynamics between two parties may be applied in
medication-taking, but the appropriate model may
depend on the parties involved. Each party may have
very different factors that affect their utility such as
prices, income, tastes, risk aversion, and so on. These
studies did not test the predictive power of these
models on medication-taking behavior.
Use of Stated Preference Methods to Quantify the
Determinants of Medication Noncompliance
Medication-taking behavior can be conceptualized as
the outcome of decisions made about whether taking a
medicine will increase utility production. If a person
decides that their utility will be increased, because of
factors such as symptom control or reduction of future
risk, they may decide to comply. If a person decides
that their utility will be reduced, because of factors
such as side effects, cost, or stigma, they may decide to
be noncompliant. Each illness and drug is associated
with attributes (symptoms, perceptions of severity,
cost, side effects, perceptions of effectiveness, attitudes
to present and future risk, convenience) and patients
must make their decisions on how to allocate their
resources based on these (and other unknown)
attributes. This trade-off results in the reported
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prescription-ﬁlling behavior seen and is actually an
expression of revealed preferences.
Revealed preferences demonstrate what consumers
actually choose to use in real-life situations, but are not
usually considered a practical option for quantifying
preferences for health care. Opinion polls and satisfac-
tion surveys provide information about what is impor-
tant to consumers and their level of satisfaction with
the current service as provided, but not information
about the potential value of future services. Neither
method can be used to identify the factors, and the
relative degree of importance of these factors, that
drive observed levels of satisfaction. In contrast to
revealed preference, “stated preference” provides a
measure of what consumers say they will do based on
a hypothetical (imaginary) scenario describing the
health-care service or intervention in question.
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are a stated
preference method, rooted in random utility theory,
assuming that people have clear preferences for goods
or services and are able to choose one good or service
in preference to another [71,72]. DCEs are part of a
group of stated preference methods called “conjoint
analysis” that elicit preferences for scenarios using
rating, ranking, or discrete choices and a concise
authoritative summary of the method’s application to
health care is presented by Ryan and Farrar [73].
There are many examples of DCE being applied to
choices between medicines [74–86]. Research suggests
that side effects of medicines consistently affect respon-
dents’ stated preferences. Using DCE to investigate
treatments for prostate cancer, Sculpher et al. reported
that men were prepared to trade life expectancy for
reduced incidence of side effects [81]. Side effects can
be minor or severe, and have different levels of impor-
tance to patients. Watson et al. were able to differen-
tiate between patients’ preferences to avoid speciﬁc
side effects of drugs used to treat benign prostatic
hyperplasia, using DCE [85]. In a cohort of people
with osteoarthritis, older people were reported more
willing to accept side effects to achieve reduced pain
than younger people [86]. This study also suggested
that previous experience of side effects led to patients
giving those side effects lower priority. This study illus-
trates the important fact that people’s preferences
can alter over time, and with experience of
the disease or medicine. Compliance with medicines
reduces over time, particularly when the disease is
asymptomatic, such as hypercholesterolemia, suggest-
ing that people reassess their preferences over time
[87]. DCEs, such as those cited above, provide a static
model of medication-taking behavior as it investigates
preference at a particular time point [88]. Neverthe-
less, sequential DCEs could be used to investigate how
preferences change over time, and how they, in turn,
affect this ongoing decision-making process. DCEs can
also examine the effect of different providers [89], the
relationship between patient and provider [90], or the
context of a consultation [90], on preferences for
medicines, if the experiment is framed appropriately. A
DCE of provision of emergency hormonal contracep-
tion reported that young women’s medicine prefer-
ences were inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by privacy and
judgemental attitudes, whereas older women’s prefer-
ences were strongly weighted by speed of access [90].
Methodological limitations of DCEs include lack of
consensus about choice set design, cognitive load of
questionnaires, and hypothetical nature of the choices
[73]. More fundamentally, there are assumptions in-
herent in this method, about transitivity in choices
(ability to rank all choices and attributes), assumptions
that people do not use shortcuts to make decisions
(“heuristics”) and that preferences for each attribute
are additive and independent. The ability of respon-
dents to understand the concept of risk within the
choice sets is not proven, and the link between stated
and revealed preferences is not clear.
Prospect Theory
While health capital theory [60] is one traditional eco-
nomic model to examine compliance, a more recent
theory, prospect theory [91], is another tractable
model. It is congruent with prospect theory that a
person may change medication-taking behavior after
the arrival of new information (such as an onset of an
adverse event, a newly published study on side-effects,
or even a friend’s bad experience with the drug). In
prospect theory, individuals evaluate costs (in this case,
risks) and beneﬁts relative to a reference point and,
importantly, this reference point will change after
the individual has made the decision in this case to take
the drug. Thus, new information about the risks of the
drug will be assessed from this new reference point. As
prospect theory describes, people are most sensitive to
losses near the reference point. This may lead to a
more extreme valuation of risk based on new in-
formation than had that information been part of a
collection of originally assessed risks. With greater sen-
sitivity to this new risk, one may observe much lower
rates of use than had all the risk information been
available from the beginning.
This hypothesis can be described as analogous to
Thaler’s mental accounting behaviors [92]. Thaler
argued that monetary costs are perceived as lower if
they are integrated or mentally grouped together. This
is because of the decreasing sensitivity to loss shown by
prospect theory. It could be hypothesized that if risk
information is processed in a way similar to monetary
units, the process of segregating risks (temporally sepa-
rating them in the decision-making process) will serve
to increase the perception of overall cost or risk. Pros-
pect theory does predict that static risk perceptions
will be biased (overweighting high risks while under-
weighting low risks), but it is silent with respect to how
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risk perceptions change in response to new informa-
tion. Models of prospect theory include a weighting
function that overweights low probabilities and under-
weights moderate to high probabilities. The model also
includes a value function for outcomes. One hypotheti-
cal study of osteoarthritis patients undergoing total hip
arthroplasty did not ﬁnd any evidence of differential
weighting of probabilities [93]. On the other hand,
another hypothetical study found that as people’s
health declines (their point of reference changes), they
are more likely to express preferences to live longer in
worse health states than currently healthy individuals
which conforms to prospect theory [94]. Although
previous research has found mixed results on the appli-
cation of prospect theory, none of these models have
examined issues surrounding compliance. In addition,
most of the research involves hypothetical situations
which are known to be biased.
Conclusions
This article describes several economic models that
could be applied to patient medication-taking behav-
ior. Future research should explore one or more
models and derive testable hypotheses from these
models. In addition, researchers should examine which
models more appropriately describe which aspect of
medication-taking behavior. Table 1 begins to place
models in the context of certain aspects of medication-
taking behavior. This table is a starting place for
researchers and should be examined more deeply and
reﬁned for various drug–disease combinations.
Application of these models to the various forms of
compliance, as shown in Table 1, underlines the dis-
tinction between concordance and the other forms
of compliance. Concordance is a process which may
affect behavior, while initial prescription ﬁll, compli-
ance, and persistence are behaviors that can be
described by the models we have discussed. Concor-
dance is best understood using models that assess the
process of interaction between patient and provider.
Bilateral bargaining can do this directly, and may be
more reﬂective of real life than concordance as gaming
is incorporated. Stated preference methods can be used
to assess the levels of preference people have for dif-
ferent attributes of a provider [89,90]. It is likely that
there are parallels between these models and those
from psychology and sociology. For example, the
trade-offs illustrated in stated preference methods can
be compared to the necessity-concerns framework in
psychology. The advantage of DCE over the necessity
concerns framework is its ability to quantify the direc-
tion and magnitude of preferences. Although we have
presented these models separately, researchers should
note that they could be combined to better describe the
behavior being examined.
These models should be applied to the study of
medication-taking behavior, and studies should be
developed to investigate to what extent these models
contribute to the understanding of medication use.
While at the present research does not exist that exam-
ines the usefulness of each model, future research
should examine which model provides the framework
for generating hypothesis regarding important covari-
ates as well as hypothesis of direction and unintended
effects of covariates. This research should also examine
the ability of each theory to predict compliance and the
value the theories have in explaining interventions to
improve compliance.
The data derived from sociological, psychological,
and economic models suggest that compliance and
persistence are affected by external modiﬁable factors,
at least as much as, or more than, ﬁxed sociodemo-
graphic factors. With a better understanding of how
these modiﬁable factors affect preferences and behav-
ior, which are most important, and how to modify
them effectively, we may be able to better support
patients in optimal medication-taking behavior.
This article is written by members of the International Society
for Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes Research (ISPOR)
Economics of Medication Compliance Working Group; part
of the Medication Compliance and Persistence Special Inter-
est Group. The authors are very grateful for discussions with
other members of the Working Group.
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